

What you didn't know ...

COL Jim Pierson showed a case of uncharacteristic nerves on the day we sent this latest publication to the printer. The nerves, though, had nothing to do with this last edition we produced under his leadership. It had everything to do with the man.

He made me cry — and others. Well, our eyes teared up and we dabbed.

As he paced and, at times, struggled with his words, he spoke of his 26 years of service in the Army. On this, the day of his retirement ceremony, he recalled the key events in his career that led him from a cadet at West Point to an Army officer serving in the Space community and his final job as the leader in charge of the Directorate of Combat Development in SMDC's Future Warfare Center.

Sometimes, the neatest things happen unexpectedly. There were many emotion-filled moments that would make the most hardened choke. He gave flowers, hugs and gifts to his mother, wife and daughter. It was his gift to his 15-year-old son, though, that made the moment.

"I thought long and hard about this," he said as he quickly tugged his West Point class ring from his finger and handed it to his son. Then, as if immediately realizing the bond that he may have broken with his fellow West Point graduates, he added: "I may have to borrow it from time-to-time for appearance sake, but that's your ring now son. There's no pressure. I just want you to have it."

Maybe a reason this hit so hard was because I retired from an Army career as well. And, my own daughter who graduated from high school a few days after my retirement ceremony four years ago is now a cadet at a service academy — the U.S. Air Force Academy, sorry West Point. And, after a tough year at the Prep School and enduring three hard years in the academy, this week she will be getting her own class ring. Soon, she will be starting her own quest with that ring that seems to carry a bond.

So maybe that's the connection.

Or maybe that's not it at all.

Maybe it had nothing to do with a ring-knocker's ring.

I think Pierson is a man like many men and women who either wear military uniforms everyday, or the business suits of Department of the Army civilians or government contract workers. I think he represents the traits of many who work on all sides of this Space cadre world. It is easy to get lost in the highly technical worlds of what we do everyday. Frankly, compared to what Pierson did with his son, it is easy to see the science, numbers, logic of what we do.

I think Pierson gave his son a legacy — it wasn't the gift.

I think he gave us all an example: It's about people, relationships.

Yes. The news once again from Space is good: Pierson leaves a hard act to follow, the pressure is really on us.

— Michael L. Howard
Editor in Chief

Time for a new Space force

Charlotte Scharer and Miller Belmont presented several valid arguments about the creation of a separate Space service in the Winter 2005 ASJ. Although both offered interesting points concerning the good and bad of creating the U.S. Space force, I would like to add additional arguments on this issue.

During my days in uniform I had the unique privilege of learning about our joint Space forces as the Chief of the Battlestaff and Space Operations Center for U.S. Space Command during the years 1996 - 1999. My responsibility included normalizing Space operations by bringing joint C2 doctrine used by terrestrial forces to our joint Space force. As I wrestled with this doctrinal issue, it became clear to me that the Space forces functioned doctrinally as either a separate service, or as a coherent joint force like our Special Operations forces use. Task organizing and command and control became easy if I treated our forces under one of these paradigms.

For instance, in the late '90s, we had three service components, Army Space Command (ARSPACE), Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and Naval Space Command (NAVSPACE) that were all service components. They were not functional components usually found in Joint Task Forces, that is Joint Force Land Component Commands (JFLCC), Joint Force Maritime Component Commands (JFMCC), and Joint Force Air Component Commands (JFACC). They were in fact the service components of a Joint Force Space Component Command (JFSCC), and looked very much like the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) model, but could also fit the role of a service-led Joint Functional Component Command.

During wargames over the last several years, the issue of a separate service would often come up. Senior Air Force officers would usually throw out a few platitudes on this issue, and often finish up with the line, "... it's just not time yet."

At a different level, the younger Air Force officers all knew it was past time. They know their future, and their past and are excited to see the creation of a separate Space force. It is clear to them that the very reasons that created the Air Force out of the Army in the 1947 National Security Act are all exactly the same reasons for creating the U.S. Space force. These young Air Force Space officers also know if they want to get promoted to colonel and above they had better be quiet on this issue. As of today, there has not been a "Billy Mitchell" to step forward from the Air Force and lead the creation of the Space Force.

It is clear that the Air Force is doing all it can to prevent this from happening. They assign pilots to lead Space forces, but won't assign Space officers to command airplanes. The

Air Force doesn't want to see the loss of its Space forces with associated doctrinal importance and budget. For no reason other than service parochialism, they have intentionally retarded the development of the Space forces.

There are numerous examples of the Air Force's failure to be good stewards of Space. The Air Force continues to underfund the Space mission remaining focused on air forces as the priority and often taking Space designated budget to further air programs. The Air Force continues to assign pilots with little or no Space force experience to command Space organizations, but yet doesn't do the opposite by assigning Space officers to command air forces. This is a very clear signal of how the Air Force views Space Officers in relation to its pilots.

The Air Force has not improved its stewardship of Space since the 2000 Space Commission which had as its charter to fix the Air Force's Space organization. They continue to mishandle the Space budget and assign pilots to command Space forces, in direct contradiction of the Space Commission and the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) direction. The Air Force pilot that commands the Space Warfare Center recently moved the Schriever III wargame to the Combat Air Operations Center at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., into a less capable wargame facility, for what appears to be the purpose of ensuring the Space guys stay under pilot control. More recently, the Air Force announced that the Space Warfare Center will be renamed as the "Air Warfare Center" and absorbed into the parent Air Warfare Center based at Nellis. Much of its functionality will be moved to the parent organization as well. This is again in contradiction to the Space Commission and SECDEF's direction on ensuring unity of command/effort under the Under Secretary of the Air Force and commander, AFSPC.

The Air Force is also behind the creation of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike (JFCC-S&GS). I recently asked an Air Force O5 Space officer assigned to U.S. Strategic Command what was behind the unnatural wedding of Space and Global Strike, and he answered "The Air Force." As of this time, it appears that the three-star commander of 8th Air Force (a pilot) will be the commander of JFCC-S & GS even though the four-star commander of AFSPC is an obvious choice. The reason behind these decisions is also obvious, but unstated.

The Air Force's approach to the integration of Space forces into theater operations is also indicative of their desire to keep Space under their control, to the detriment of the JTF they support. The current plan is that the JFACC (a pilot) will be designated the Space Coordinating Authority (SCA)

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and coordinate all in-theater Space activities. Because these officers typically know very little about Space, AFSPC has provided a senior Space officer to fill the position of director, Space Forces, to conduct this mission and provide needed expertise. The result has been that the director of Space Forces becomes knowledgeable of air operations and providing Space support to that mission, but has only indirect understanding of the JFLCC, JFMCC, and JSOTF use of Space. If a separate Space force were created, then we would almost certainly have a JFSCC integrating Space into theater operations, and better support for the entire force.

The 2000 Commission on Space Organization spoke to the Air Force's failed stewardship of the Space force in its Jan. 11, 2001 report. The commission stopped just short of calling for a separate U.S. Space corps (modeled on the U.S.M.C.) or U.S. Space force, and instead put all the pieces in place to quickly create one of these organizations if the Air Force doesn't successfully perform the Space mission. If you step back and look at the commission's recommendations, you see they have put all the structure in place to quickly

create the U.S. Space force. The Undersecretary of the Air Force would become the Secretary of the Space Force, the National Security Space Office would become the secretariat staff and AFSPC becomes the service staff and forces. The budget has also been created through the designation of the Space military funding program 12. The dissolution of USSPACECOM into USSTRATCOM was the final step in normalizing the Space forces and preparing for the creation of the Space force. Space forces are now exactly like ground, air and sea forces with no dedicated combatant commander guiding their operations.

The only compelling argument against creation of the U.S. Space force is that the creation of the Air Force in 1947 was a mistake and it should be recombined with the Army, thereby enhancing jointness. Since this is not a viable argument, then it should be assumed that there will be a creation of a U.S. Space force, and that the only remaining question is when.

A question often asked of me over the last few years on the U.S. Space force issue was the role of Army Space Forces in the U.S. Space force. This is a question better debated amongst Army

Space officers, and I offer my thoughts, although they are not conclusive on this matter.

One option is that Army Space officers spend their early years as they do now, working in the Army in non-Space positions. Then at the appropriate time, they transfer to the U.S. Space force, ensuring that the U.S. Space force is joint in nature and connected to the Army. The other option, and the one I think we should follow, is to follow the paradigm of Army Aviation forces and Air Forces. In the Space force case, Army Space Forces conduct the mission of integrating Space power into Army operations and providing forces operating in near-Space and in-theater integrating capabilities, in a manner similar to Army Aviation, working with the U.S. Space force and in the Joint Force Space Component Command when formed.

Now this is a topic worthy of debate amongst Army Space officers! As for the creation of U.S. Space force ... it's just a matter of time!

— Glen C. Collins
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