

What you didn't know ...

Every Soldier has a story to tell.

It is easy to lose sight of this simple point. Today tons of information hit us as we work through routine tasks in the course of a day, week, month or year. Google any word or phrase you want and you will get the welcome news that the search engine has found one million hits for you search parameters. Check your e-mail every five minutes and you have 10 new notes with changing details and challenges. E-mails fill our inboxes with more information by the hour. Newspapers, Web sites, television news shows, radio talk, magazines all bombard us with information.

Is it really helpful to add more information to this pile? I hope so. The way I see it, everything we do in the Army revolves around taking care of Soldiers in our Nation's defense. And everything we do in the communications arena — to include publishing *the Army Space Journal* — point directly to this bull's eye on the target. The tagline in this business of communications is that every Soldier has a story to tell, but it's deeper than that. It is not just every Soldier, but every Soldier and Department of the Army civilian and contract employee involved in this fight has a story.

For example, the civilian sitting behind a desk whose efforts push vital information forward to the warfighter so he can do his job better, the contractor who ensures the right supplies reach the right people in theater so they can do their jobs, or the Soldier who deploys in harms way — what is his day to day life like?

The goal of our communications enterprise — and everyone in the Army is part of this enterprise — is to get the word out. Our focus with information we put into *the Army Space Journal* centers on Soldiers, along with Army civilian and contract employees, involved in providing Space-based capabilities to help the warfighter effort. We welcome articles across a wide spectrum — from articles written on technical issues members of the broad Space cadre face to lighter articles that help readers gain an understanding of the Space community inside the Army. If you have ideas for stories or would like to write on an issue, please let us know.

With all that said once again, the news from Space is good. I apologize for the delay in publishing. I believe the team has put out another great edition. Please remember as you read: Every Soldier, civilian and contract employee involved in Space-related jobs has a story to tell. Also, please remember my offer as you go through your daily tasks in Space-related jobs: Let us help you tell your story.

Happy reading and I hope to hear your story soon.

— Michael L. Howard
Editor in Chief

Letter to the Editor

Congratulations

Congratulations on your fine efforts for the most recent issue of the Army Space Journal. I received my copy a few days ago. I am once again impressed with your phenomenal ability to pull together such a diverse compilation of useful information. Congratulations!!

I also applaud your incremental inclusion of information about the Soldiers assigned to the 100th Missile Defense Brigade and how missile defense and Space are inter-related. A solid understanding of this relationship is obviously crucial for all missile defense — Space professionals. Well done, indeed!!

Again, thanks so much for the superb effort. I look forward to working with you to help provide this outstanding publication for the Space professional community.

— Thomas Askins
Senior Military Analyst
SYColeman

“Parochial” attack criticized

The parochial attacks in your Spring 2005 issue by Glen Collins on the Air Force and its stewardship of the military Space program are troubling not just because it grates on the ear in this era of jointness, but also because he could be so misinformed on basic facts.

He states that “the very reasons that created the Air Force out of the Army in the 1947 National Security Act are all exactly the same reasons for creating the U.S. Space force.” That is absurd. In World War II the Army Air Forces were not only massive — consisting of over 2.2 million personnel and 218 combat-ready groups — but they had also performed a host of crucial missions that have never been attempted by Space forces. During the war the AAF flew not only reconnaissance, surveillance, airlift, artillery spotting, liaison, communications relay, electronic warfare, mine laying and similar support missions, but more importantly, it also flew hundreds of thousands of force application missions. In other words, it bombed, strafed and rocketed countless enemy targets both on the front lines and deep in the enemy’s rear — both on land and at sea. On the other hand, there are currently no weapons in Space. Although force application is a stated potential mission, that mission has not yet been performed by U.S. Space forces. Perhaps someday weaponization of Space will take place — but that is a thorny political issue that the military will not decide. Until and unless Space is weaponized and Space assets actually engage directly in force application — not simply identifying targets or relaying data or providing GPS coordinates — there will never be a comparison between Space and the AAF of World War II as Collins attempts to do in his letter. Put another way, today the mili-

tary Space forces of the U.S. are engaged solely in force support to all the services and other government agencies; until they can conduct an independent mission, until they can actually employ force — as could the AAF and which led to its independence, there is little rationale for Space becoming a separate service.

Collins then states: “The Air Force continues to underfund the Space mission remaining focused on air forces as the priority and often taking Space designated budget to further air programs.” This too is simply false. The Air Staff has produced a stunning sand chart graph (below) that shows the total budget authority for all USAF programs from the 1960s until the present day. (Note: total budget authority includes R&D, procurement, operations, maintenance and personnel; in short, everything.) The facts show that at present between 25 and 30 percent of the entire USAF budget is going towards Space, and that number is increasing. At the same time, it is spending only 25 percent of its budget on combat aircraft — fighters, bombers, missiles, special operations, and munitions — and that number is decreasing. In other words, the USAF spends more on Space than it does on combat aircraft. How can anyone claim that those statistics are indicative of underfunding? The USAF has long prided itself on the fact that it provides over 90 percent of all DoD funding for military Space. If Collins seriously believes that is too little, than we all need a different dictionary.

Finally, Collins slams the Air Force for being insufficiently supportive of U.S. Strategic Command’s new functional structure that includes a commander for “Space and Global Strike.” He murmurs that this new commander will be the three-star commander of Eighth Air Force, not the four-star commander of Air Force Space Command. Why? Collins hints darkly that “the reason behind these decisions is also obvious, but unstated.” Really? Actually, the reason is quite clear and logical. STRATCOM has stood up six new functional commands, one of which is Space and Global Strike. (The other five are Missile Defense, Network Warfare, ISR, Global Network Operations and the Joint Information Operations Center.) All of these functional commands are headed by either two or three-star officers. Why does Collins believe that Space and Global Strike is being slighted by not having a four-star commander when none of the other functions do? Moreover, as noted above, the commander of AF Space Command has no conventional force application assets at his disposal. Whereas, the commander of Eighth Air Force has under him the B-2s and B-52s that would be expected to actually conduct such Global Strike missions. (Eighth Air Force also commands the air-breathing ISR assets required for such missions: Joint STARS, Rivet Joint, Compass Call, the U-2, etc.) The
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Letters to the editor are welcome and encouraged. **The Army Space Journal** reserves the right to edit for brevity and clarity. Unfortunately all letters cannot be printed due to Space. You may send letters to the editor in chief at michael.howard@smdc-cs.army.mil

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concept of a supported versus a supporting commander is well established in joint doctrine: Global Strike is supported — and necessarily so — by the sensors, communications and positioning satellites based in Space. But when it comes time to actually act; only the long-range strike assets of Eighth Air Force can do the job. There is nothing nefarious about this arrangement; it is merely sound joint doctrine.

It is regrettable that Mr Collins cannot put aside his green uniform and avoid the pitfalls of parochialism. Moreover, I'm disappointed in your magazine for condoning and perpetuating this sort of interservice rivalry. You have a responsibility to promote Jointness. Collins' facts and logic are so obviously flawed you could have and should have set him straight. Instead, you have allowed an official Army organ to be used as a mouthpiece for a parochial diatribe. You need to get with the Joint Program.

— Phillip S. Meilinger,
Col (USAF, Ret)

I recently picked up a copy of the Spring 2005 ASJ and was intrigued by the title of the letter to the editor, "Time for a new Space force" by Mr. Glenn Collins. As a member of the U.S. Air Force Space community, I was looking forward to reading the letter to see what arguments and support the author would put forth in the debate on this issue. However, as I read the letter it became clear that the reasons put forth by Mr. Collins and more importantly, the support for those reasons was severely lacking. The author did not provide any concrete support for his arguments other than a few anecdotes and personal opinions, which while sounding authoritative, do not stand the test of critical reasoning. This letter will address only three suppositions Mr. Collins puts forth but then offers no corresponding facts of support.

First, the author posits that younger Space officers are so concerned about getting promoted that they are reluctant to step forward and become the next "Billy Mitchell" to spur on the creation of a separate Space force. Where are the facts for such a statement? Did the author take a random poll of junior officers to substantiate this claim? We are left to wonder and take his statement at face value. But having served in the Space and missile career field for 16 years, I have never heard any discussions from junior or senior officers on this subject, let alone a fear of reprisal. Speaking from experience, the vast majority of junior officers do not spend any

amount of time concerned with the political aspects of Space force organization. Day in and day out, they are more concerned with the tactical execution of the Space mission they have in front of them, which does have a direct bearing on their future promotion possibilities.

Second, the author seems to have a fascination with who commands both air and Space organizations. In four separate paragraphs, Mr. Collins uses as support for Air Force foot-dragging on the issue of a separate Space service that the Air Force assigns pilots to lead Space organizations, but no Space officers are assigned to lead flying organizations. Using this logic then, if we just named a few Space officers to command flying units, things would turn out all right. Clearly this would not make a difference in the formation of a new Space organization. There is another problem with this assertion however, and that is the author's statement that this dichotomy is in violation of the Space Commission report.

In his letter, Mr. Collins incorrectly states that the Space Commission report had the "charter to fix the Air Force's Space organization." The charter of the commission which was directed by Congress was among other things, to "assess the organization and management of Space activities that support U.S. national security interests."¹ The focus of the commission was on all national Space entities and processes, not just the Air Force. Mr. Collins asserts that the Air Force is violating the Commission's mandate by assigning pilots to command Space forces.

The Commission's recommendations did not prohibit the assignment of other than Space professionals to command Space units, nor did Congress when it enacted the legislation to implement many of the Commission's recommendations into law.² It is true that the commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) used to be "tripled hated" with authority over two other commands, but that arrangement has since been separated so his sole focus is on AFSPC. Also, Mr. Collins does not tell us what Space commands are being led by non-Space officers. The closest I can come would be the Vice Commander of AFSPC, Lieutenant General Daniel P. Leaf. I would submit that his background in Operations Iraqi Freedom as the Director of the Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) to the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) makes him a great choice to ensure that Space forces maintain a warfighter's outlook on their operations.

The current commander of AFSPC, General

Lance Lord, is a career Space and missile officer as is the commander of 14th Air Force who oversees the daily operations of Space forces. Even the Deputy Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is a career Space and missile officer who left the National Security Space Office to go to USSTRATCOM.

I find it somewhat ironic that Mr. Collins would say that the Air Force is not complying with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) guidance on the issue of pilots commanding Space units, when the SECDEF himself named Marine General James E. Cartwright, a naval aviator with no Space experience, to command USSTRATCOM. USSTRATCOM is in charge of all military Space activities for the nation. I guess the SECDEF figured with an Air Force Space officer as his deputy, General Cartwright would do all right. This leads me to my last point about USSTRATCOM and the new Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike (JFCC-S&GS) organization.

Third, the author maintains that the Air Force was behind USSTRATCOM's decision to form the JFCC-S&GS and that the 8th Air Force commander was chosen over the "obvious choice" of the Commander, AFSPC; he again infers that pilot politics had something to do with the decision. I cannot dispute the accuracy of his claim as I have no knowledge of the JFCC-S&GS genesis; however, I do dispute his rationale that the commander of AFSPC was not selected for the reasons Mr. Collins alludes.

Any major command in the Air Force or other service is mandated by Title 10 of U.S. Code to organize, train, and equip forces for the combatant commands. These four-star major commands, AFSPC included, are not designed to be warfighting organizations. In the Air Force, command and control of warfighting units is executed by our Numbered Air Forces (NAF) of which 8th Air Force is one, but so is 14th Air Force which belongs to AFSPC. If a Space unit were to be selected to head the JFCC-S&GS, the logical choice would not be AFSPC, but 14th Air Force. 14th Air Force has the command and control organization in place with their Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California to effectively direct operations which they currently do for all combatant commands. Again, I do not know the details of this organization, but to assert that it was done for the reasons that are "obvious, but unstated" does not hold up to further scrutiny.

To be fair to Mr. Collins, I do agree that the Air Force has not always had the same outlook on their responsibilities when it comes to the nation's military use of Space as they do now. Indeed, it seems it was the Space Commission report that really forced the Air Force to step up to their lead service responsibilities when it came to national military Space operations. However, great strides

have been made to implement the recommendations of the Space Commission and the resultant law passed by Congress.

As Senator Bob Smith, (R-NH) co-sponsor of the bill to implement the recommendations of the Space Commission said on the Senate floor,

Space dominance is too important to the success of future warfare to allow any bureaucracy, military department, or parochial concern to stand in the way. To protect America's interests we need to move forward consistent with the spirit of the Space Commission. This legislation is a good first step.³

This is the same conclusion that the Space Commission itself came to when it concluded, "Meanwhile, near- and mid-term organizational adjustments should be fashioned so as to not preclude eventual evolution toward a Space Department if that proves desirable."⁴

This is a good first step and it does not mean that the debate over this issue should be shelved but the debate must go beyond mere anecdote and personal beliefs. If we are to advance the debate on the nation's need for a separate Space force, let us do so with cogent arguments backed by critical reasoning that will enable decision makers to choose the right course of action.

— Lt. Col. Tracy L. Knueven,
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1. The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 11, 2001, p. 1.

2. Senate Bill S.1368, To amend title 10, United States Code, to improve the organization and management of the Department of Defense with respect to Space programs and activities, and for other purposes. 107th Congress, 1st Session, August 3, 2001

3. Congressional Record: August 3, 2001 (Senate), Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, Page S8913-S8972.

4. The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 11, 2001, p. 80.