



OWNING THE EFFECT

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The Need for Collaboration and Compromise in Space Command and Control



LTG Francis Kearney, III, USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, speaks during the Combatant Command Panel (Joint Operations: Space as a Force Multiplier) at the 2009 Strategic Space Symposium. Also shown: LTG P.K. “Ken” Keen, USA, Military Deputy Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Harold W. “Punch” Moulton, II, USAF, Director of Operations, U.S. European Command. The Symposium was held in Omaha, Neb. Nov. 2- 4, and was cosponsored by U.S. Strategic Command and the Space Foundation.

During the 2009 Strategic Space Symposium a Combatant Command panel, comprised of Deputy Commanders from U.S. Strategic Command and specific Geographic Combatant Commands, discussed the topic, “Joint Operations: Space as a Force Multiplier.” All of the representatives in attendance – U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. European Command – were in agreement on several issues, to include the importance and ubiquity of space in their operations.

However, one question posed by the audience highlighted some inconsistency among the panel. The Deputy Commanders were asked to provide opinions on the present ability to integrate space effects into their planning and operations. Several points were made, to include the need for a single voice on requirements, but the conversation quickly turned to command and control of space capabilities. U.S. Strategic Command stated that regional or theater ownership or control of assets makes it harder to flex in support of general requirements. U.S. Special Operations Command represented the need for redundancy of space capabilities to offset risk. U.S. Southern Command stated it was not a matter of who owed the assets but instead how they would be used and the need for sharing agreements. U.S. European Command articulated its requirement to “own the effect” and necessarily retain some of the attributes that come with ownership or control – e.g. timing and tempo. Moreover, U.S. European Command recommended the onus for execution be placed on U.S. Strategic Command while the responsibility

“During multi-national operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount.” JP 3-1

for operational planning and intent remains with the Geographic Combatant Commands, and asserted that if the two are not fully synchronous, then the Geographic Combatant Command needs to own the capability.

This set of divergent views reflects a difference between those whose focus is primarily on global capabilities and those whose focus is on the tactical and operational levels of combat, and illustrates the challenges faced by commanders and their staffs when attempting to plan, synchronize, and assess contributing space effects, particularly compartmentalized or special access capabilities. The range of responses from the Geographic Combatant Commands reflects the obvious, that one’s perspective is, to a degree, influenced by one’s present duties and responsibilities; and understandably so.

There is a persuasive argument associated with centralized command and control – outside of the warfighting theaters – of space assets, the point of which is to retain flexibility to support multiple theaters and maintain unity of command over capabilities that are often considered low density and global assets. However, there is an equally persuasive argument for decentralized planning and execution – within the warfighting theaters, – the point of which is to ensure timely and optimized synchronization with other theater assets and ensure all contributing effects – space being only one – are locally assessed in direct relation to tactical, operational and theater strategic measures of effectiveness. Recognizing the credibility of both positions, it is not constructive to argue against the need for unity of command and global flexibility, nor is it practical to argue against a warfighting commander’s requirement to synchronize and ultimately be responsible for effects. Instead, acknowledging the fact that optimal joint space command and control relationships are still a debate with no absolute construct, constructive dialogue needs to highlight the essential elements necessary to establish a unity of effort, which is critical to finding a balance between the two positions. The intent of this article is to engage in that constructive dialogue and assert that regardless of the type of conflict – e.g., general warfare or insurgency – or operational theme – e.g., major combat operations or irregular warfare – empowered decentralized planning and collaborative execution are essential to achieving a unity of effort, which is critical for achieving operational and tactical relevance. To enable the discussion this article briefly considers the flexibility

of joint doctrine for command and control and reviews a relevant vignette from Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The flexibility of joint doctrine for command and control rests upon the assumption that one size does not fit all; more specifically, flexibility is achieved by applying different command and control options depending on the circumstances. Joint Publication 1 (JP 1) sets the foundation and provides guidance for such flexibility by detailing the different command authorities and purposes, for example the flexible command authority established through a supporting relationship. Additionally, Joint Publication 3-14 (JP 3-14) underscores the need for flexibility: “In the past, command of satellites and space systems supporting multiple CCDRs [combatant commanders] have not been transferred to a CCDR. However, there may be a need during operations for command of these resources to be transferred to a CCDR.” Based on this particular language, it would naturally follow that command of resources may also flexibly transfer to a Geographic Combatant Commander, when the space systems are supporting a single area of responsibility. Therefore, in its current form joint doctrine may seem capable of transcending the differences of opinion expressed by the flag officers at the Strategic Space Symposium.

Unfortunately, what seems easy on paper is rarely seamlessly transferred to reality, especially in application to Counter Insurgency environments. The current spectrum of emerging capabilities – e.g., Network Warfare – often delineated as specific lines of effort or operation with their own pre-designated supported commands, can create planning and coordination challenges, which complicate application in operational and tactical settings. This particular view may not be intuitive for all organizations, but for the warfighting commander and staff the ability to walk effects to the operational and tactical edge heavily relies upon decentralized planning and immediate collaboration during execution. If the capabilities in question are not owned by the warfighting commander then (at a minimum) general directives, as a derivative of local planning and concept of operations development, must rapidly flow to the capability owner. Moreover, the directives have to be complete and precise to ensure elements of purpose, timing and duration satisfy the critical need to synchronize all contributing effects planned for the local operation. This is certainly not a unique requirement, for example, fire support planning and execution follow

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this necessary prescription. The active ingredients to create this unity of effort are clear statements of commander's intent joined with empowered decentralized planning and direct coordination with forward deployed elements. Coupled with a thorough appreciation of specific operational circumstances, would similar emphasis aid the responsive integration of space capabilities in support of warfighting commanders?

The following example from Operation Iraqi Freedom may serve to illuminate this discussion.

In 2007, an operation in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom implemented a Direct Support command authority, Direct Support to Multi-National Force Iraq, for the employment of specific space capabilities. Operational Control was maintained by U.S. Strategic Command through Joint Functional Component Command – Space. Tactical control was delegated to the Joint Forces Air Component Command and executed through the Combined Air Operations Center. The Secretary of Defense established – by Execute Order – command and control structure, the result of practical discussions among supported and supporting commands, was aimed at alleviating concerns of the Multi-National Force Iraq commander while still maintaining unity of command through U.S. Strategic Command.

This command and control structure was met with mixed feelings but its intent met the minimum acceptable structure in support of the Multi-National Force Iraq concept of operation, which was developed in support of a more inclusive operation including intelligence gathering, influence, and offensive operations. The element leading the operational planning effort, and reporting directly to the Multi-National Force Iraq commander, was the Multi-National Corps Iraq command, control and communications Space and Special Technical Operations cell.¹ The overall Multi-National Force Iraq operation required integration of several contributing effects or efforts from different organizations and agencies; therefore, success depended upon close coordination and collaboration. During both planning and execution, the Multi-National Force Iraq commander provided guidance to the Multi-National Corps Iraq command, control and communications Space and Special Technical Operations cell, which in turn directly coordinated with in-theater intelligence agencies, Force and Corps planners, the Department of Defense joint planning and execution community, and the Combined Air Operations Center. Further, during execution, the Multi-National Corps Iraq command, control and communications Space and Special Technical Operations cell provided direction – based on Multi-National Force Iraq commander's guidance for purpose, timing and tempo – to the Combined Air Operations Center, which in turn facilitated the supporting

space effort in concert with the Joint Space Operations Center.

During the operation, challenges directly related to timing and tempo surfaced with the contributing space capabilities which threatened the synchronization of other contributing effects or efforts and ultimately the purpose of the Multi-National Force Iraq operation. The challenges were caused by different interpretations of the command and control structure by action officers outside the theater of operation, specifically a lack of understanding of the critical authority granted in the direct support relationship which was established to ensure the contributing space effects were executed in concert with the Multi-National Force Iraq commander's intent for the overall operation. The direct result was execution decisions being made outside the theater, without consulting the supported commander, which contrasted previously adjudicated application of the space capabilities and without thorough understanding of the second and third order operational impacts. The uncoordinated decisions began to undo previous coordination and agreements between Multi-National Force Iraq and theater intelligence agencies, and started to uncouple previously synchronized effects or efforts. Fortunately, through empowered direct coordination by the Multi-National Force Iraq commander in conjunction with his Space and Special Technical Operations cell and the Combined Air Operations Center/Joint Forces Air Component Command, the supporting space effect was guided more in line with the intent of the overall operation after direct dialogue at the flag officer level.

Post event analysis of the challenges faced during the 2007 Operation Iraqi Freedom operation indicates there is no blame. Instead, the situation was a reflection of different training and understanding across dispersed organizations. Specifically, the degree of authority granted by the executive order for the established direct support relationship was not fully understood and complied with. In this particular situation well intended action officers, in the process of informing their commanders, would have benefitted from previous joint training exercises or experiences that incorporated the flexible arrangement provided by the support command authority defined in JP 3-1. Additionally, expanding Joint Space exercises to include adequate exposure to the requirements of dynamic direct support to forward deployed Land Forces, would provide action officers insight into the necessary cost/benefit analysis performed when considering the employment of capabilities in support of operational and tactical scenarios. In fact, for all space professionals responsible for integration of space capabilities in support of Joint Force Land Component operations, awareness of the innate cost versus benefit analysis performed by warfighting commanders is crucial. For when faced with the analysis of the benefit of the

contributing effect in comparison to the challenges associated with its synchronized implementation, the warfighting commander may be forced to choose more time and experience proven methods.

The purpose of this vignette is not to prescribe a single solution for all circumstances. Most scenarios where assets are forward deployed to a specific area of responsibility logically call for delegation of Operational Control or Tactical Control to a Geographic Combatant Command to be deemed acceptable and suitable for an operation. Instead, the purpose of the example is to highlight the key attributes that made that particular operation successful. For those directly involved at the pointy edge of the Multi-National Force Iraq operation, the lesson learned was simple: in order to truly “own the effect” empowered decentralized and collaborative planning and collaborative execution were essential. While Multi-National Force Iraq planners were responsible for the planning, execution and measures of effectiveness for the overall operation, Combined Air Operations Center planners remained concerned about the technical planning, execution and measures of performance for the contributing space capabilities. The glue that held it all together was direct coordination and collaboration. Unity of command was not fully preserved, however a recognizable and critical unity of effort was realized. The message is that although there may not be a single command and control structure compatible with

all circumstances, unity of effort is paramount to achieving operational and tactical relevance and cannot be realized without empowered collaboration.

As previously stated, the intent of this article is to engage in a constructive dialogue for the purpose of highlighting the essential elements necessary to establish a unity of effort. Unity of effort is critical based on a desire to find a balance between the divergent views expressed at the Strategic Space Symposium, and echoed by commander’s and staff in the field. This article asserts that regardless of the type of conflict (e.g., general warfare or insurgency) or operational theme (e.g., major combat operations or irregular warfare), empowered decentralized planning and collaborative execution are essential to achieving a unity of effort, which is critical for achieving operational and tactical relevance. The vignette included in this article does not represent a perfect model for all circumstances; instead it demonstrates an integration model which was highly responsive to the four star warfighter, critical to a unity of effort, and essential to the operational and tactical relevance of the contributing space capabilities. Ultimately, if a balance is to be found between unity of command and the need for warfighting commanders to “own the effect,” we must be willing to approach command relationships pragmatically, preserving the important aspects of both positions, and ensuring communication paths are clear to facilitate immediate collaboration during execution. 

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(Endnotes)

¹ The Multi-National Corps Iraq Command, Control and Communications Space and Special Technical Operations cell (or Tech Operations Division), a standard element of all Corps deploying to Iraq, is led by an FA40 and augmented with members of Army Space Support Teams, the Multi-National Force Iraq Air Component Coordination Element (as was the case during the 2006-2007 Operation Iraqi Freedom rotation), and joint manning document assigned positions (e.g. Intelligence, Psychological Operations/ Military Deception, Electronic Warfare, Space). The Multi-National Corps Iraq Command, Control and Communications Space and Special Technical Operations cell is the focal point for the Multi-National Corps Iraq and Multi-National Forces Iraq commander.

BIO



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became an FA40 after 20 years of service as a Field Artillery Noncommissioned and Commissioned Officer. He is currently Training with Industry at Lockheed Martin, while completing his M.S. in Space Systems Management. He is scheduled to become the Chief of the Experiments Division, Future Warfare Center Battle Lab. His previous space assignments include: Assistant S3, Plans, 1st Space Brigade; Chief, Special Technical Operations, Multinational Corps-Iraq; Deputy Ballistic Missile Defense System Manager, Joint Functional Component Command – Integrated Missile Defense. LTC Reid received his M.A. in Liberal Arts at the University of Southern Indiana.